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There is broad consensus that the therapeutic alliance constitutes a core common
factor for all modalities of psychotherapy. Meta-analyses corroborated that alliance,
as it emerges from therapeutic process, is a significant predictor of therapy outcome.
Psychotherapy process is traditionally described and explored using two categorically
different approaches, the experiential (first-person) perspective and the behavioral
(third-person) perspective. We propose to add to this duality a third, structural approach.
Dynamical systems theory and synergetics on the one hand and enactivist theory on
the other together can provide this structural approach, which contributes in specific
ways to a clarification of the alliance factor. Systems theory offers concepts and tools
for the modeling of the individual self and, building on this, of alliance processes. In the
enactive perspective, the self is conceived as a socially enacted autonomous system
that strives to maintain identity by observing a two-fold goal: to exist as an individual
self in its own right (distinction) while also being open to others (participation). Using
this conceptualization, we formalized the therapeutic alliance as a phase space whose
potential minima (attractors) can be shifted by the therapist to approximate therapy goals.
This mathematical formalization is derived from probability theory and synergetics. We
draw the conclusion that structural theory provides powerful tools for the modeling of
how therapeutic change is staged by the formation, utilization, and dissolution of the
therapeutic alliance. In addition, we point out novel testable hypotheses and future
applications.
Keywords: psychotherapy, common factors, synergetics, attractor dynamics, enactive cognitive science,
mathematical psychology, relaxation times, Fokker-Planck equation
Introduction
Common Factors in Psychotherapy
In this theoretical and methodological paper, we wish to address the therapeutic alliance, an
essential constituent of psychotherapy, in a novel way. We will start from the common factors
debate in psychotherapy research, which has focused on alliance as a prominent common factor
of psychotherapy process. An important, albeit often tacit, issue in psychotherapy and in cogni-
tive science is the persisting duality of experiential (first-person) and behavioral (third-person)
approaches in investigations of psychological entities such as the therapeutic alliance. Each
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common factor, each active ingredient of psychotherapy, can
be defined and monitored either at the experiential or at the
behavioral level.
A basic definition of psychotherapy may be this: Psychother-
apy is a learning process, which relies on general mechanisms
of action that are implemented using psychological techniques
and interventions. Techniques are provided during a scheduled
social interaction between therapist and patient with the goal
of alleviating the patient’s disorders and improving health and
well-being.
Psychotherapy research has shown a sequence of developmen-
tal stages since its beginnings in the early 19th century (Freud,
1900/1989). A large number of modalities of psychotherapy have
evolved since Freud’s psychoanalysis: humanistic, (cognitive-)
behavioral, and systemic schools. In the 1950s, the field entered
its “legitimation phase” because general concerns had been
prominently voiced that psychotherapy effectiveness would not
exceed spontaneous remission rates. In response to this criticism,
a vast number of efficacy studies, reviews, andmeta-analyses were
conducted; they demonstrated that psychotherapies of many dif-
ferent approaches are at least moderately, often highly effective
for the treatment of many different kinds of psychopathology.
The field thus arrived at a firm evidence-based consensus that
psychotherapy is considerably more effective than no treatment
or placebo treatment. One result of the legitimation phase was
however unexpected: all meta-analyses consistently found only
few signs of a superiority of any particular one of the many psy-
chotherapy modalities (Wampold, 2001). As a consequence, a
novel research priority developed, aimed at identifying the com-
mon factors that apparently underlie all psychotherapies. The
field entered a new stage with a focus on the psychotherapy
process in general: What is it that makes therapy effective?
The current discussion in psychotherapy research strongly
emphasizes these common factors. Such factors are called “com-
mon” for two reasons: First, they are present in quite differ-
ent and even opposing therapy modalities. A second meaning
of “common” is that these factors are effective in the treatment
of quite different disorders and problems. In the discussion on
the general mechanisms of how psychotherapy works, common
(i.e., unspecific) factors are usually contrasted with specific fac-
tors that are grounded in the therapist’s specific techniques and
interventions. Proponents of the common factors view would
assume that the common factors, not the specific techniques,
are crucially or even exclusively involved in bringing about psy-
chotherapy effects. Examples of common factors that are shared
by all psychotherapymodalities are “hope instilled in the patient,”
the “cognitive restructuring” of the patient’s belief system, the
patient’s “corrective emotional experience,” and patient and ther-
apist establishing a trusting, cooperative relationship, namely a
“therapeutic alliance.” A survey-based description of those 22
common factors that have been discussed most frequently was
provided by Tschacher et al. (2014b).
Many of the common factors put forward by psychother-
apy researchers have overlapping content. Therefore, several
authors have tried to systematize the discussion by grouping the
common factors. One may distinguish (Cornsweet, 1983) aspects
of the therapeutic relationship, cognitive factors and therapist
factors. Omer and London (1989) clustered common factors
in four higher-level categories: Relationship factors, expectancy
effects, reorganizing factors, and therapeutic impact. Grencav-
age and Norcross (1990) found in their review of the literature
five groups of common factors: Client characteristics, therapist
qualities, change processes, treatment structure, and therapeu-
tic relationship. Grawe (2004) reviewed the empirical evidence
of psychotherapy research accumulated toward the end of the
20th century, and proposed four essential common factors: Acti-
vation of the problem in the therapeutic setting; activation of
a patient’s resources; motivational clarification; coping with the
problem. Finally, factor analysis of the mentioned list of 22 com-
mon factors (Tschacher et al., 2014b) resulted in four dimen-
sions: Patient’s cognitive processing, problem solving, emotional
processing, and the building up of a therapeutic alliance.
The common factor that is, sometimes implicitly, present in
all of these groupings, and that was investigated in most detail is
clearly the therapeutic relationship or alliance; the general impor-
tance of alliance as a change factor is recognized by almost all
researchers of psychotherapy process. By the mid-1990s, a major-
ity of empirical studies had supported a positive effect of alliance
on outcome, compared to some studies finding no association
and a single study finding a negative association. This clear evi-
dence in favor of the contribution of alliance was strengthened
by additional empirical studies one decade later (Orlinsky et al.,
2004).
Alliance, as it is discussed in psychotherapy research, is itself
composed of a number of variables. An encompassing meta-
analytic review of the effectiveness of therapeutic relationships
was conducted in a task force project of the American Psy-
chological Association to establish an evidence base for ther-
apy relationships (Norcross, 2011). The following aspects of
therapeutic relationships were distinguished: Bond, empathy,
goal consensus, positive regard, congruence, collecting feed-
back from the patient, repairing relationship ruptures, avoid-
ing countertransference, and matching the individual patient.
In sum, each of these aspects of a multi-faceted alliance con-
struct positively and significantly predicts therapy outcome. The
respective meta-analyses yielded effect sizes around 0.3, i.e., a
weak to moderate effect of alliance with respect to therapy
success.
The Duality of Perspectives on Alliance
In psychotherapy research, alliance is addressed at two cate-
gorically different levels. From a first-person perspective, alliance
is something that is experienced by the members of the rela-
tionship. A common representation of interpersonal experiences
in psychology is the interpersonal circumplex model (Leary,
1957). Interpersonal space is assumed to have two dimensions,
communion (love) and agency (power). Interactional experi-
ences in a social relationship such as the therapeutic alliance
can be described as a blend of experiences of communion
and agency, thus as a region in a two-dimensional circumplex
(Figure 1). A characterizing property of experiential states is
that they have “intentionality” (Brentano, 1874): Experiences are
“about something” in the sense that an experience almost always
contains a reference to something.
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FIGURE 1 | Circumplex model of interpersonal experiences and problems. The description of a problem is given for each octant of the circumplex (after
Horowitz, 2004).
A third-person perspective of alliance is accessible by the objec-
tive observation of relationship behavior. Behavioral measures
are overt body movement, the pressing of buttons in a psycho-
logical experiment, physiological responses etc. In addition, there
is a standard short-cut in psychology by which even experien-
tial data (i.e., subjective judgments) can be transformed into an
objective, third-person form. To do this, experiential judgments
are operationalized by intersubjectively validated measures such
as questionnaires. This has been done extensively in the con-
text of (experiential) circumplex theory, e.g., by the Inventory of
Interpersonal Problems (IIP, Horowitz et al., 1988), a measure of
current difficulties in interpersonal functioning. The eight sub-
scales of the IIP pertain to eight octants of the circumplex model
of interpersonal behavior (Figure 1), and the respective blend of
agency and communion is assessed using questionnaire items,
which quantify a person’s judgments.
The physical level of alliance also yields a third-person
description; it can be directly addressed through observable
motor behavior and may be defined in terms of the degree of
behavioral coordination and cooperation of persons. There are
a number of implementations of this general idea. A method that
assesses such coordination by the quantification of synchronized
motor behavior of a patient-therapist dyad is Motion energy
analysis (MEA, Ramseyer and Tschacher, 2014; Tschacher et al.,
2014a). MEA measures the correlation of body movement of
interactants, where movement may be estimated by the amount
of pixel changes in a digital video of the respective interaction
(Figure 2). The resulting correlational measure yields the degree
FIGURE 2 | Movement of interactants in a video (left) can be visualized
by highlighting of pixel changes between consecutive frames (right).
The correlation of both persons’ time series of pixel changes yields a measure
of non-verbal synchrony.
of non-verbal synchrony, which has been repeatedly shown to be
a significant marker of alliance quality.
The idea of objectifying social alliance by a synchrony mea-
sure can be generalized to several other fields of social interaction.
Synchrony may come to the fore also in the shape of verbal syn-
chrony, such as the interactants’ shared use of words, symbols,
idioms, or narratives—the higher the overlap in their vocabular-
ies, the closer the alliance. People interacting closely also tend
to show similar patterns of facial expressions (such as smiling
or frowning), features of the voice (e.g., alignment of prosody),
and body postures (e.g., both interactants crossing arms in front
of the chest). In social psychology, such phenomena of bodily
synchronizations are summarized by the concepts of contagion
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(Hatfield et al., 1994) or mimicry (Chartrand and Lakin, 2013).
At an abstract level, the various synchrony findings indicate that
social relationships are not merely experienced but definitely also
embodied.
Our goal in this article is to arrive at a more encompass-
ing understanding of the common factor “therapeutic alliance.”
According to our hypothesis it is thereby necessary, and viable,
to overcome the conventional separation between the subjective-
experiential and the objective-behavioral descriptions of relation-
ship. The methodology of operationalization in psychology like-
wise attempts to overcome this separation by translating experi-
ences into behavioral data. We wish to proceed a step further still,
and explore a level that is neither experiential nor behavioral. We
demonstrate that there are methodologies by which this may be
accomplished: the structural science of systems theory and the
enactive approach in embodied cognitive science. Finally, both




In a previous article, Kyselo (2014) conceptualized the psycholog-
ical self as an autonomous system (Maturana and Varela, 1980)
that is socially “co-enacted” and constituted by two poles, dis-
tinction and participation. The psychological self, within mental
architecture seemingly the core of individuality, is therefore at
the same time a social structure. This means that the human
self is brought forth through interactions and relations with oth-
ers and is characterized by two dialectical strivings, on the one
hand toward a sense of self as being distinct from others, and
on the other hand toward a sense of self as being open to and
affected by others. The resulting directions or poles, distinction
and participation, shape the individual’s relations and interac-
tions. They may be viewed as a fundamental dimension of the
self, and at the same time, the building block of sociality and
thus, in a next step, social alliance. Maintenance of the self is
effected by the intersubjective co-negotiation between distinction
and participation.
The enactive approach aims at bridging the gap between the
first-person and third-person perspectives described in the pre-
vious section. It holds that subjectivity and third-person organi-
zational description are complementary: With the generation of
an autonomous identity a system is considered to acquire its very
own perspective on the world, based of which it evaluates interac-
tions and constructs meanings (Varela, 1995; Weber and Varela,
2002; Thompson, 2007). Therefore, enactivism transcends the
duality of subjective and objective knowledge in the fundamen-
tal psychological construct of the self: Objectively speaking, the
self is a self-other enacted network of social relations, subjec-
tively speaking this network brings about a sense of self which
grounds a basic perspective on the world. Subjective and objec-
tive perspectives are thus joined in the lived social existence of
the self.
Dynamical Systems Theory and Synergetics
A second method to mend the duality of perspectives may be
seen on the background of the theory of science (Brunner et al.,
2011), which differentiates not only the natural sciences (e.g.,
physics, biology, geology) from the humanities and arts (Geis-
teswissenschaften such as history, science of art, philology), but
also recognizes a further group of sciences, the structural sciences
(e.g., mathematics, cybernetics, systems theory). Structural sci-
ences reside at a level where only the relations between formal
objects are addressed, irrespective of any content or ontology.
Correspondingly, research subjects in psychology, including the
self and the therapeutic alliance, may be analyzed using a three-
fold physical-mental-structural view instead of the dualist body-
mind dichotomy. This grouping corresponds to Popper’s three
worlds theory, which distinguishes the physical world, the mental
world, and the world of thought products and art works (Popper,
1972).
The general idea is that the structural perspective is neither a
first- nor third-person perspective. Nevertheless, experiential or
objective data may serve as the components of structural models.
In other words, structural models suspend the categorical differ-
ence of first- and third-person descriptions. An encompassing
structural framework is for instance offered by dynamical sys-
tems theory (DST, e.g., Guckenheimer and Holmes, 2002) and
self-organization theory (synergetics: Haken, 2000). DST is aimed
at the deterministic modeling of change and stability of a sys-
tem, whereas synergetics specifically models pattern formation
and phase transitions, in which deterministic and stochastic pro-
cesses are combined. Both structural disciplines are based on a
formal mathematical terminology.
Proponents of self-organization theory have presented var-
ious approaches to model the emergence of novel properties
arising from lower levels of a hierarchy. Such “contextual emer-
gence” (Atmanspacher and beim Graben, 2009) assumes a struc-
tural relation between different levels of description. For example,
the mind may be viewed in the context of neuronal dynam-
ics (Haken and Tschacher, 2010). A recent reconstruction of
intentionality, the defining property of first-person experience,
in terms of synergetics and contextual emergence was presented
by beim Graben (2014). He used a dissipative non-equilibrium
system (so-called magnetic surface swimmers) to show that
self-assembling patterns with intentional behavior can be based
on, but not reduced to, simple physical and electromagnetic
laws.
In this vein, Kyselo and Tschacher (2014) have previously
elaborated the idea that the psychological self—and social
relationships between selves—may be analyzed using structural
concepts joining enactive embodied theorizing with DST. As
mentioned, the individual self is hypothesized, in enactivist
terms, to exhibit two independent strivings, distinction and
participation. Kyselo and Tschacher (2014) proposed a model
using a geometrical phase space that is spanned by distinction
and participation as two different dimensions; they are seen as
the coordinate axes of phase space. The stability of all distinc-
tion/participation states were symbolized by basins and hills in
the “landscape” of such a phase space. The elevation of a state
in phase space, its third dimension, reflects an “energetic” value
(the potential V) of that state. As system states x tend to relax
toward states of lower energy, the momentary state of a system
follows trajectories (like a ball that would roll downhill). In DST,
a potential minimum (basin) is an attractor of the phase space
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of a system, denoting states with lower potential and thus higher
probability; analogously, a hill denotes a repellor. One may say
that the behavior in x follows a probability distribution p, where
p(x) is negatively related to V(x).
Here, we continue the project of describing interaction
dynamics in structural terms. We assume that distinction and
participation are two poles of a single dimension x, akin to
Horowitz’ communion axis of the circumplex (cf. Figure 1).
Compared to Kyselo and Tschacher (2014), who allowed orthog-
onal (uncorrelated) distinction and participation dimensions,
this means a simplified initial step of modeling. Thus we premise
here that distinction and participation are mutually exclusive
states of x. Two examples of the ensuing one-dimensional phase
space are depicted in Figure 3. Let us illustrate this for the
case of an individual who commonly interacts (behaviorally)
“in sync” with other individuals, which may (experientially)
be related to wishes of signaling social connectedness. In the
structural model, this translates to a state of x more toward
participation. Consequently, the phase space of this individ-
ual may have an attractor in a region with rather high
participation (Figure 3A). Qualitatively different behavior is rep-
resented by the attractor in Figure 3B, which is flatter and
broader.
In what follows we will apply this methodological
framework—enactive terms integrated in a DST approach—in
order to address our main question: How can we use these tools
to model and understand the therapeutic alliance?
FIGURE 3 | Two examples of structural models of the phase space of
the self of an individual. The potential function represents repelling and
attracting regions of the distinction / participation axis x. The current state of
the individual is illustrated by the position of the “ball” in the landscape. With
time the ball tends to roll “downhill,” into an attractor with low potential values
(trajectory: red arrow). Note that when started from identical initial conditions,
the self-state changes in opposite directions in (A,B).
Toward a Minimal Model of Therapeutic
Alliance
We have argued that the individual core of mental architec-
ture, the self, can at the same time be seen as a social struc-
ture. In the following, we will rely on the assumption that each
individual can be described in terms of the socially enacted
self and as obeying a two-fold norm of (social) distinction and
(social) participation. From this perspective it is therefore less
than surprising that psychotherapeutic intervention, as a learn-
ing process acting on the patient’s self, is a social project at all
levels—the “commonest” of all common factors of psychother-
apy is the social alliance between therapist and patient. In Kyselo
and Tschacher (2014) we have described a conceptualization of
dyadic relationships. Our goal in the present article is to eluci-
date a particular relationship, namely that between therapist and
patient. We thus aim at a minimal model of (dyadic) therapeutic
relationships.
Alliance is a system that evolves through the coupling of the
individual self-systems of the interactants; such self-systems were
depicted in Figure 3. In terms of DST, the therapeutic alliance
can be described as a new, joint phase space on the basis of the
selves of therapist and patient. Changes in the interaction dynam-
ics of the alliance can be modeled as trajectories through this
phase space, and recurring or stable interaction patterns are rep-
resented by attractors in it. The individual self-models of Figure 3
consisted of the distinction-participation dimension x, and a fur-
ther dimension, the potential V, that gives a value to each x.
Accordingly, the alliance phase space is constructed by merging
two individual phase spaces (the therapist’s and the patient’s, x1
and x2) and a potential value. This three-dimensional structure
represents the joint complexity of the alliance in terms of auton-
omy of two individuals who negotiate their respective identities.
The alliance phase space is spanned by x1, x2, and the attrac-
tion/repulsion of each point in the plane, V(x1, x2). V(x1, x2)
represents the result of therapist’s and patient’s negotiations of
the alliance between them.
Even if we know the individual phase spaces, they will not suf-
fice to fully specify what the “landscape” of alliance phase space
looks like. We cannot know the negotiation results. The struc-
ture of the landscape depends on the contributions or behavior
of the specific individuals, but their resultant particular interac-
tion dynamics over time is not completely determined by them,
instead it emerges from their interaction. This “negotiation” may
appear reminiscent of game theory, a mathematical tool used
by decision-making theory in economics, biology and linguis-
tics (Benz et al., 2006). Game theory would conceive of alliance
formation as the result of two rational players who use linguis-
tic and other strategies to maximize their respective utilities and
pay-offs. Some game-theoretical scenarios lead to a Nash equi-
librium, which might be viewed as representing the alliance that
is formed by the cooperative, competitive, or mixed strategies
of the players, therapist and patient. Game theory, however, is
fraught with a priori assumptions such as players’ rationality and
the presence of a defined utility matrix, which appears rather far-
fetched in the psychotherapy context. In therapy, one “player,”
the therapist, will not pursue his own benefit but the patient’s best
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interests. Furthermore, psychotherapy concerns the clarification
of irrational experiences and behaviors.
Let us continue with our description of alliance phase space.
Two possible examples for the formation of an alliance phase
space are illustrated in Figure 4A. It shows an alliance with a
single attractor, which is located in a region with moderately
participatory behavior of person 1 (x1) and distinctive behavior
of person 2 (x2). A quite different alliance pattern is given by
Figure 4B: in addition to the attractor of the other example, per-
son 1’s preference for highly distinctive behavior prevails for all
values x2 of the other person. The two participants of this dyad
have constructed a one-sided, but quite coherent social system.
In the extreme case of dyadic interaction completely lacking, the
alliance phase space would be flat, unless where both persons
incidentally have overlapping potential basins or hills.
In other words, the formation of an alliance is not merely
determined by the phase spaces of the individual persons alone,
but critically depends on the kind of coupling between the per-
sons when the alliance is formed. Alliance formation will in turn
also influence individual self-maintenance. We may know the
shapes of the individual phase spaces and thus their probability
FIGURE 4 | Two exemplary structural models of the phase space of an
alliance. The potential function V (x) represents repelling and attracting regions
of the distinction/participation plane of therapist and patient, x1 and x2 (red
arrows: trajectories). (A) Phase space with one attractor. (B) Two attractors.
distributions, but the joint probability p(x1, x2) is unknown. In
order to shedmore light on this process of alliance formation and
the emerging joint probability distribution, we will now model
the alliance in formal terms.
First we consider the individual person. We assume that
his/her self can be described by a potential V that depends on a
single variable x, i.e., V = V(x), which has a single minimum (see
the examples in Figure 3). According to our background assump-
tions, x belongs to the interval x ⊂ (xdistinction, xparticipation). We
attach to V(x) a probability distribution
p(x) = Nexp(−V(x)/Q). (1)
V(x)/Q is an analog to the thermodynamical concept of free
energy (Friston, 2011). In Equation (1) the normalization con-
stant N is chosen such that all probabilities add up to 1:
∫











Q is a constant parameter (see also below). A simple though










which is centered around x = β (5)
The Gaussian Equation (4) becomes flat for α small (cf.
Figure 3B), and strongly peaked for α large (cf. Figure 3A). This
invites a psychological interpretation: α large models a “strong”
or rigid personality x, which is stable against external perturba-
tions. Small α represents an “unstable self ” that is easily influ-
enced by outside forces (in terms of social science statistics, α is
the inverse of variance, β is the mean of the distribution).
Second, let us turn to an alliance of two individuals 1 and 2,
who have distinction-participation variables x1 and x2, respec-
tively. In this case it is more convenient to start with the joint
probability p(x1, x2), which we write in analogy to Equation (1)
as
p(x1, x2) = N1,2 exp(−V(x1, x2)/Q) (6)
We first consider two limiting cases. The first case is: there is
no alliance formation, thus the two selves are independent of
each other. According to probability theory, Equation (6) then
factorizes, i.e., the joint probability is simply the product of the
individual probabilities
p(x1, x2) = p(x1)p(x2). (7)
Independence in alliance formation may lead to a phase space as
in Figure 4A: The attractor is in a region where both persons have
p(x)> 0.
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A very strong mutual (symmetric) alliance, on the other hand,
implies a strong coupling between x1 and x2, which can be
modeled by Dirac’s (infinitely) peaked δ-function
p(x1, x2) = δ(x1 − x2) (8)
Our concern in psychotherapy is a moderately to strongly unidi-
rectional alliance in the sense of a bond of the patient with the
therapist: the patient’s self is “bound” to the therapist. An alliance
phase space of this kind may look like in Figure 4B.
To capitalize on relevant results of synergetics, we character-
ize the behavioral patterns of persons 1 and 2 as follows: Person
1 (the therapist) changes his/her behavior slowly over time (due
to the therapist’s role behavior, which is rooted in work experi-
ence and training) with the limiting case of a therapist who is not
subject to any external influences at all:
p(x1) ≈ δ (x1 − xfixed) (9)
Person 2, the patient, is willing (and able) to change behavior
within a certain time. In mathematical terms, these “relaxation
times” of behavior change (“relaxation” is unrelated to the psy-
chological meaning of this word—in physical sciences, relaxation
time is defined as the time needed by a system to return to equi-
librium after a perturbation) are t1 ≫ t2. Correspondingly, the
relaxation constants γ = 1/t obey
γ1 ≪ γ2. (10)
Under these conditions, the slaving principle of synergetics holds
(Haken, 1977). The slaving principle states that slowly varying
systems achieve control over systems varying more quickly (it
should be noted that slaving is a purely technical term not to
be confused with political connotations such as “enslavement”).
According to this principle, the joint probability p(x1, x2) can be
written, other than in Equation (7), as
p(x1, x2) = p (x1|x2) p(x1) (11)
where the conditional probability








and p(x1) is strongly peaked, as expressed e.g., in Equation (9)
and Figure 3A. While Equation (11) is the standard formula of
probability theory, Equation (12) is our specific result, which is
derived from a Fokker-Planck equation (Haken, 2004, pp. 202–
204). In the present context, Q2 represents the effect of random
influences on 2, the patient. Large Q2 entails small Q
−1
2 ∼ α in
Equation (4), meaning high variance of self-states, i.e., volatility
and little resilience.
An interesting consequence for the therapist is this: It makes
sense in therapy to curb Q2, e.g., by strengthening the self-efficacy
and the resilience of a patient. f (x1) in Equation (12) means shift-
ing the patient’s distinction-participation attractor of x2 (from a
former x2 = β2) to a new value x2 = f (x1) fixed by the therapist.
In the present context, the explicit form of f (x1) is not needed
because the therapist just has to give it a special value (which,
according to Equation (9) depends on his/her stable attractor
x1 = β1).
While in physical systems (in thermal equilibrium) a fixed
relation between γ2 and Q2 holds, this is not so in self-organizing
systems. In psychological systems, we may assume that γ and Q
can be chosen independently. Then person 1 (the therapist) is
characterized by γ1 small, Q1 very small, so that α = γ1
/
Q1 →
∞ (the therapist is immune to the impact of perturbations).
Individual 2 (the patient) is characterized by γ2 large (willing-
ness and/or capability of adaptation). γ2 is maintained or even




The outcome of therapy concerns the effect on person 2’s
potential, V2(x2). From Equations (1, 11, 12, 9) follows ln N −
Q−12 V2(x2) = ln p(x2|x1) = ln N2|1 − γ2
/
Q2 (x2 − f (x1))
2,
so that
V2 = const + γ2(x2 − f (x1))
2 with f (x1) = x2, new fixed (13)
Clearly, the effect of therapy is a shift of the position of the min-
imum of V2, i.e., a new stable attractor in the patient’s distinc-
tion/participation. This reflects new attitudes and/or behavior
patterns. One may add that, in addition to the shifting of x2, a
further goal of therapy is to lower Q2 toward the end of therapy
and thus to increase the patient’s resilience. Resilience is essen-
tial to preserve therapeutic gains post-therapy, and to prevent the
patient’s returning to old attractors in response to stressful live
events.
Discussion
We have initiated this paper with an introduction to the cur-
rent focus of psychotherapy research on common factors. The
most frequently discussed single factor is the therapeutic alliance.
We explored this factor from three different perspectives: The
first-person/experiential perspective provides subjective data, the
third-person/behavioral perspective objective data, and, impor-
tantly, the structural/dynamical systems perspective models both
kinds of data in an abstract way. We believe that the latter struc-
tural view is a significant amendment to the theory of psychother-
apy because it promises to bridge the duality of subjective vs.
objective approaches. Both subjective and objective data sources
are valuable and indispensable, but they are much supported by
an additional structural scaffold and generator of hypotheses,
which we have shown can be provided by enactivist ideas that
are then framed in the structural formalism of synergetics.
Before we discuss implications of the structural model pre-
sented above, we wish to address limitations of our treatment of
the therapeutic alliance. An important aspect that we have not
discussed in this article is the role of embodiment (Leiblichkeit in
phenomenology, the material self of James, 1890). Embodiment
is emphasized by the enactive approach to the self, which deter-
mines the status and role of the body more explicitly. The body is
both the mediator and the matrix of social relationship and inter-
action. It grounds a sense of identity as separate (distinction),
but also allows the person to be affected by the other (partic-
ipation). The delevolped styles of engagement and qualities of
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interaction are inscribed in interactants’ bodies, thus determin-
ing their current patterns of interaction. An important goal of
future research will be to investigate how subjects co-negotiate
their selves through bodily mediated engagements and how this
is experienced in terms of a bodily sense of self. A further essen-
tial aspect is that a self is self-referential: Tschacher and Rössler
(1996). We also did not explicitly cover the idea that the self is
an emergent structure. Thus several further aspects of the self
are discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature on
consciousness and the self. The present considerations are not a
full-fledged theory of the self, but they do provide a “minimal
model” of therapeutic alliance that can be used as a heuristics and
as a basis for further investigations.
We are aware that our use of enactivist, structural, and
mathematical concepts may appear unusual to psychother-
apy researchers and especially clinicians. Hence, it is all the
more important to tie our approach to empirical evidence in
the field of psychotherapy, and to show that new hypothe-
ses and explanations may arise from it. We now sketch some
of these empirical and practical implications in the following
remarks.
Complexity Reduction in Alliance Formation
We have stressed the idea that alliance formation is crucial for
change to occur in psychotherapy. This was illustrated by the
geometrical phase space models (Figure 4) and expressed by the
joint probability distribution of Equation (6) and its elabora-
tion by the slaving principle of synergetics in Equation (11).
Such alliance formation processes were observed in empirical
studies, which showed that functional alliance is not gener-
ated by the “summation” of the participating individual systems,
i.e., by the multiplication of individual probability distributions
as in Equation (7). Instead, a novel system with interactive
autonomy is formed during social interaction processes. This
is what some enactive theorists would refer to as “participa-
tory sense-making” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Without
going into detail here, we may mention that numerous empir-
ical findings speak for a reduction of complexity during the
formation of therapeutic relationships (Tschacher et al., 2007).
Reduced complexity means higher order and organization of the
observed behavior due to the presence of attractors in alliance
phase space. Figure 5 depicts how order changed in a single,
exemplary therapy course. This psychotherapy of 59 sessions—
which allowed computation of 39 consecutive omega values cov-
ering the complete course of therapy—was a Rogerian, client-
centered therapy conducted at the outpatient psychotherapy
clinic of the University of Bern. The patient was a woman aged
33 years. Her treatment entailed a larger than average symp-
tom reduction (above the 75th percentile of the symptom check-
list of the cohort at that time: Tschacher et al., 1998). The out-
come in this therapy was especially favorable with respect to
the social and phobic anxiety and depression symptoms of this
patient.
Significant complexity reduction was also consistently found
in empirical studies where the MEA methodology, mentioned
in Section Introduction, was used (Tschacher et al., 2014a). Ver-
bal, non-verbal, and other synchronies (e.g., based on judgments
and meaning) indicate that the individuals are now parts of a
coupled system. Coupled systems, especially non-linearly cou-
pled systems, cannot be reduced to their components—a novel
structure has emerged.
Alliance is a Special Relationship
Therapeutic alliance is a special, asymmetrical relationship. In
any social interaction, individuals have to negotiate their own
self-maintenance in particular ways. There are some social inter-
actions, however, that become more relevant than others to the
individual’s ability for preservation and organization of the self.
FIGURE 5 | Omega, a measure of system order (the inverse of
complexity), was measured in a moving window throughout an
exemplary therapy of 59 sessions. Linear trend, quadratic trend, and a
spline approximation (λ = 10) are shown as dashed, green, and brown lines.
The data illustrate the overall order increase (reduction of complexity) in the
course of this psychotherapy.
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The therapeutic alliance is one example for such a special rela-
tionship because it provides the patient with an opportunity
for forming a relationship that is expected to not only perturb
the patient’s self-maintenance but also to foster and develop the
patient’s self-maintenance in the first place. That said, we see
that the therapeutic alliance is an asymmetrical social relation
because the focus of the interactions is on the patient, and the
very goal of forming the relationship is to improve the patient’s
self-maintenance and not the therapist’s (Equations 8, 9). In
this, the patient-therapist alliance resembles an infant-caregiver
relationship.
In the therapeutic alliance the therapist’s phase space has
become part of the patient’s phase space offering calibration
opportunities in regions that a “normal” joint phase space
would potentially offer, but that the patient cannot reach by
him-/herself because of developed attractors and meta-stable
attractor ruins (Tsuda, 2013). In terms of the enactive approach
this is to say that the therapist, instead of evaluating the
social interaction with regards to his/her own self-maintenance
(by the negotiation of distinction/participation), evaluates it
with regards to the patient’s self-maintenance. One might say
that the two individuals effectively form a new autonomous
identity whose self-organization relies on the contribution of
two individuals but at the same time refers to only one of
them (the patient). The therapist “offers” his/her striving for
autonomy to the patient engaging in the interaction as an
autonomous subject but at the same time evaluates the interac-
tions heteronomously as contributions to the autonomy of the
patient.
This also explains why authenticity is so important: the thera-
pist must be both able to provide experiences of connection and
of separation; if the therapist however acts “superior” or detached
and not as a proper subject, the patient cannot experience the
sense of open-ness required for developing a balanced distinc-
tion/participation. The therapist experiences the social interac-
tion but reacts in it in a way as to accommodate the agreed goal
of the alliance, that is to assist the patient’s self-maintenance. The
therapist lends him-/herself as a subject to build up a new identity
for the patient; the tool for this is the interactive autonomy of the
alliance.
Temporality
The temporality of the therapeutic alliance is essential in several
respects. Quite fundamentally, time scales play an important role
as a key premise of self-organization processes. The two partic-
ipants of the alliance have different relaxation times (Equation
10), which is the basis of the slaving principle. Therapists there-
fore have deeper and steeper attractors, see Equation (9), which
they can employ to shift the location of patients’ attractors and
thus achieve a desired outcome.
Timing is also important because therapy courses pass
through different stages. The therapy course shown in Figure 5
is illustrative in this respect because it shows that the order of the
alliance often reaches a maximum at a time prior to the termina-
tion of therapy. Thus, later in the therapy course, the therapeutic
bond has to dissolve, which can be measured by indicators of
order and complexity.
Corrective Experience
In the formation of alliance, the patient’s phase space is
augmented through the therapist’s phase space in that the
therapist enables the patient to undergo “corrective emotional
experiences,” one of the acknowledged common factors of psy-
chotherapy (Tschacher et al., 2014b). This modifies the attractor
landscape and allows the system to shift to formerly unattain-
able regions and to develop new trajectories and attractors
(Equation 13). The therapist provides attractors to the alliance
landscape that the patient cannot provide and does not (yet)
have.
There are three points to be considered in the provision of
corrective experiences. The first is the ability of the therapist to
provide the patient with an augmented attractor landscape—can
the therapist be a subject who offers both experiences of distinc-
tion and participation while not evaluating them with regards
to him-/herself but to the patient? In other words, can therapist
and patient form a new system by merging their individual phase
spaces into one? It should be noted that it is only a partial fusion
as the therapist is not to evaluate the outcome of the merging
interaction with regards to him-/herself.
The second point is the potential of the interaction dynam-
ics to gradually enable the patient to maneuver the augmented
attractor landscape according to the goals of the patient’s self-
maintenance. This requires a flexibility and increased aware-
ness on side of the therapist who has to provide the missing
attractors/repellors when needed and/or when it is possible.
A third, and very crucial point is whether the alliance pro-
vides the patient with the capacity to dwell in his/her own new
attractors in a way that does no longer involve the intervention
and scaffolding provided by the therapist. The ultimate goal of a
successful alliance is that the joint phase space becomes properly
incorporated into the self-maintenance structure of the patient
so that the therapist’s contribution becomes obsolete. The thera-
pist therefore has to enable the patient, by curbing Q2, to develop
and rely on own abilities. In other words, the successful alliance
allows the patient to interact with the therapist without staying
emotionally dependent. Alliance dissolution is a major goal of
psychotherapy when the change work is done.
Outlook
We formulated a minimal model of therapeutic alliance starting
from a one-dimensional concept of the psychological self with the
poles distinction and participation. It will be a task of extended
structural modeling to capture further aspects of the self (the
agentic, embodied, self-referential, emergent self) in more com-
plex models or through case-by-case analyses of the presented
minimal model.
For empirical psychotherapy research, the present model gen-
erates a number of testable hypotheses, which to our knowl-
edge are novel in psychology. The model claims, in Equation
(10), that therapist and patient variables show markedly diver-
gent relaxation times. The divergence of relaxation times leads
to the slaving principle, a core proposition of “microscopic”
synergetics (Haken, 2004), which provides a directed hypothe-
sis for psychotherapy research: Successful therapists have much
longer relaxation times than their patients. Ensuingly, some
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effort should be invested in exploring appropriate psychological
indicators and measures of relaxation time, a psychometric task
that appears to be resolvable. Enhancing γ2
/
Q2, as we stated
above, is the goal during therapy: It can be achieved by patient’s
short relaxation time (which means high relaxation constant γ2)
and high resilience against stressful perturbations (which means
small Q2).
The testing of the core premise of our structural model—
via the relaxation times and resilience of therapist and
patient—could serve as an elegant cross-validation of previ-
ous “macroscopic” findings that psychotherapy systems as a
whole self-organize, leading to the complexity reductions men-
tioned above in Section Complexity Reduction in Alliance For-
mation. Patient’s resilience as a target of intervention is quite
familiar to psychotherapy—one may think of stress inocula-
tion training in cognitive behavioral approaches, which enhance
Grawe’s common factor “coping with the problem” (Meichen-
baum, 1977). If, in addition, relaxation times prove to have favor-
able psychometric properties, a number of practical applications
will come within sight. These applications may lead to feedback
systems and innovations in therapist training, both major topics
in current psychotherapy research (cf. Lutz et al., 2009; Taubner
et al., 2013): A measure of relaxation time could be installed as a
feedback device to predict positive outcome based on the dynam-
ics of the therapeutic alliance, and therapists’ training may in
the future include interventions into own and patients’ relaxation
times.
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